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ABSTRACT: India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, have
averted crises through geopolitical weaponry rather than through
the frameworks of conventional deterrence theory and mutually
assured destruction. An analysis of three distinct conflicts between
these two nations reveals the inadequacy of a bipolar systemspreserving model of deterrence theory to explain their responses.
Future confidence-building measures must come from an emphasis
on shared history and culture.

C

ontrolling tensions and de-escalation take on distinct processes
and meanings in the Indo-Pakistani context. Conventional
deterrence, epitomized by a Cold War strategy of mutually
assured destruction, does not fully explain the picture. The threat of
mutual annihilation has never been genuine given the physical and
cultural closeness of India and Pakistan; consequently, the existential bias
in deterrence theory does not shape how India and Pakistan use nuclear
weapons. Conventional deterrence theory flexes its analytical muscle
more often in cases of immediate deterrence—during times of a pressing
specific threat—than during times of general deterrence where the focus
is on preventing military conflict between rival nuclear giants. As such,
India and Pakistan manage (de)escalation as an exercise in geopolitical
weaponry, engaging their nuclear capabilities as political tools to obtain
economic and political goals within the wider international community.
As demonstrated by the early 2019 India-Pakistan military standoff,
responsibility for crisis management falls on the shoulders of Indian
and Pakistani leadership. They cannot count on external countries
like the United States to intervene significantly and/or spearhead deescalation.1 In the future, India and Pakistan will have to learn, adapt,
and script new bilateral forms of confidence-building measures, drawing
more from their shared history and culture than some abstract sense of
game theory. Moreover, trilateral negotiations including permutations
of the big five nuclear states—the United States, Russia, China, India,
and Pakistan—are still pertinent.2 Nevertheless, such a reality will also

1. Dan De Luce and Robert Windrem, “With Trump Silent, No ‘Sheriff ’ in Town on PakistanIndia Crisis, Ex-Diplomats Say,” NBC News, March 5, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news
/world/trump-silent-no-sheriff-town-pakistan-india-crisis-ex-diplomats-n979406.
2. William Walker, “International Nuclear Relations after the Indian and Pakistani Test
Explosions,” International Affairs 74, no. 3 (July 1998): 505–28.
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have to take into account nonstate actors and various terrorist/militant
groups that continue to take advantage of emergent situations.3
This article briefly discusses India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
programs and stresses the strategic interrelationships in the region
extend beyond a simple dyad. This operating framework will speak to
the limitations of the bipolar systems-preserving model of deterrence
theory when analyzing the South Asian security situation. The article
then considers three distinct military conflicts between India and
Pakistan that have occurred since 1998: the 1999 Kargil War, the
2001–2 India-Pakistan standoff, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The
article uses these conflicts to investigate the nature of escalation and
de-escalation—especially the role of external diplomacy in defusing
various tensions.
Finally, the article considers the conflicts in early 2019 involving
India and Pakistan, focusing on the immediate events following the 2019
Pulwama attack. This history will explain how tensions arose between
India and Pakistan and how both countries not only ratcheted up their
aggressive discourse toward one another, but more importantly how
they eventually engaged in effective crisis management. Both countries
did so in a new way that de-escalated the situation and altered their
appreciation for the role of crafting stability themselves. The United
States played a less interventionist role in early 2019; consequently, both
India and Pakistan had to contend with a situation that did not rely
on the diplomacy of external nation-states.4 The 2019 standoff shows
crisis management is a process, a set of dialogues, and an ongoing
experiment necessitating limited military confrontations as operationalcum-heuristic opportunities.

Conflict from the Beginning

Partition was the original sin. With the dissolution of the British Raj
in 1947, millions of people were displaced during the formation of India
and Pakistan as two sovereign nations. The resulting situation was not a
political vacuum in the strict sense; instead, the violent partition ensured
a complex set of relations and territorial disputes that would remain just
as contentious as on the eve of India’s independence.5 Despite diverse
ethnicities in their populations, India and Pakistan—secular nationstates—share kinship with respect to history and culture.
Indo-Pakistani relations have witnessed several violent conflicts over
the past decades including the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and countless
other border skirmishes and limited military confrontations—some

3. Robert S. Litwak, “Recalibrating Deterrence to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism,” Washington
Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2017): 55–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302739.
4. Lexington, “The Trump Administration and the Indo-Pakistan Crisis: How America First
Works in Kashmir,” Economist, March 7, 2019, https://www.economist.com/united-states
/2019/03/07/the-trump-administration-and-the-indo-pakistan-crisis.
5. See Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia:
Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
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having to do with Kashmir.6 Because of this history and the fact both
countries possess nuclear weapons, their mutual hostilities have reached
a level of concern. At first glance, such concern is somewhat moderated
by the operating frameworks of conventional deterrence theory, or so
it seems.
Yet India and Pakistan cannot be thought of as small-scale versions
of larger nuclear states; their South Asian-styled path to the nuclear
age was heavily influenced by external actors—the United States and
China—who were inextricably part of the nuclear deterrence posture
and strategy of both countries.7 As a result, becoming a nuclear power
did not mean India and Pakistan inherited a classical deterrence theory
manual that would automatically apply to conflict between them.

Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions

In the early 2000s pundits were debating whether India could
maintain escalation dominance. India began to consider developing
tactical nuclear weapons as a strategic way to pressure Pakistan to
disband or dissuade anti-India terrorist groups. According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 2018
Yearbook, India and Pakistan have around 140 nuclear warheads in their
respective arsenals.8 India has been able to produce plutonium for use
in nuclear weapons, while Pakistan is working on transitioning from the
production of highly enriched uranium to plutonium.
The SIPRI report also states India and Pakistan are expanding their
arsenals and testing capabilities. India has air-, land-, and sea-based
missiles, securing a robust second-strike capability. Meanwhile, Pakistan
is working toward narrowing the gap to match India’s triad by developing
a sea-based nuclear missile delivery system. Although India continues to
claim a no-first-strike policy, it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons
in a preemptive counterforce strike if it believes Pakistan is gearing up
for a first-strike attack. Also under its current doctrine, India reserves
the right to use nuclear forces first when they are attacked with biological
or chemical weapons.9
Recent changes in Indian military doctrine, however, raise concerns
for Pakistani leadership. The Indian Army developed the Cold Start
Doctrine as a fix to what it saw as a slow mobilization of forces to
halt attacks coming from Pakistan. During the 2001 attacks on the
Indian Parliament, Indian forces were slow to mobilize along the Line
6. G. W. Choudhury, “Bangladesh: Why It Happened,” International Affairs 48, no. 2 (April 1972):
242–49, https://doi.org/10.2307/2613440.
7. Robert Einhorn and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, The Strategic Chain: Linking
Pakistan, India, China, and the United States, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series
(Washington, DC: Brookings, March 2, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the
-strategic-chain-linking-pakistan-india-china-and-the-united-states/.
8. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2018), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB18c06.pdf.
9. Kumar Sundaram, and M. V. Raman, “India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear
Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (2018): 152–68, https://doi.org/10.1080
/25751654.2018.1438737.
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of Control, the de facto border between India and Pakistan. According
to one source, the Cold Start Doctrine was developed to:
Facilitate smaller scale, rapid, and decisive conventional offensive operations
into Pakistani territory in the event of a Pakistani-sponsored asymmetrical
attack on Indian soil before the international community can actively
intervene, and before Pakistan would feel compelled to launch nuclear
retaliatory strikes to repel an Indian invasion. It is still unclear what CSD
specifically entails, and senior Indian officers have on purpose remained
ambiguous about it.10

On the Pakistan side, the first-strike policy is part of Pakistan’s
nuclear doctrine but is better understood in the context of its overall
defense principles. The Pakistani military views its first-strike posture
as purely deterrent. Pakistan reserves the right to use nuclear weapons
first, but only after certain thresholds have been crossed—if an invasion
is imminent. These thresholds could take the form of particular military
strikes targeting more than just military assets or attacks that put the
national security and sovereignty of Pakistan at severe existential risk.
A risk to strategic stability may also occur as a result of unevenness
in the development of regional nuclear forces and capabilities among
China, India, and Pakistan. This disparate regional nuclear development
means “redundancy is weak, flexibility is limited, and the security of the
deterrent’s primary arm is menaced.”11 “Their [China, India, Pakistan]
land-based ballistic missile systems (along with aircraft in the Indian and
Pakistani cases) serve this core function, and, when limited in size and
in fixed locations, they are vulnerable to first-strike destruction by an
adversary with superior nuclear forces.”12
Another facet to be taken into account pertains to how external
countries intervened early in the establishment of India’s and Pakistan’s
growing nuclear weapons arsenals. According to a now-declassified
1981 US State Department report, “if the two South Asian states
moved to develop nuclear weapons, both China and the USSR would
have strong temptations to shape relations among the four countries.”13
Another section from the same document reveals US officials trying to
ascertain the Indian perspective: “From New Delhi’s vantage point, the
possible nuclear threat from China has been the underlying incentive
for supporting the nuclear weapons option. India believes China’s longrange goal is the domination of all of Asia.”14
10. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Is the Indian Military Capable of Executing the Cold Start
Doctrine?,” Diplomat, January 29, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/is-the-indian-military
-capable-of-executing-the-cold-start-doctrine/.
11. Robert Legvold, “The Challenges of a Multipolar Nuclear World in a Shifting International
Context,” in Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Global Order,
ed. Steven E. Miller, Robert Legvold, and Lawrence Freedman (Cambridge, MA: American Academy
of Arts & Sciences, 2019), 47.
12. Legvold, “Multipolar Nuclear World,” 47–48.
13. US Department of State (DoS), Bureau of Intelligence and Research, India-Pakistan Views
on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential Repercussions, FOIA release July 28, 2005, (Washington, DC:
DoS, June 25, 1981), https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114242.
14. US DoS, India-Pakistan Views.
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Another recently declassified document confirms the United States,
while not sanguine about supporting Pakistan’s development of nuclear
weapons, in fact turned a blind eye, much to India’s chagrin.15 The
former Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq and Chinese Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping convinced the United States to continue providing Pakistan
economic and military aid. During this period, US Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown said: “There are limits on our ability to aid Pakistan
because of their nuclear explosive program. Although we still object to
their doing so, we will now set that aside for the time being, to facilitate
strengthening Pakistan against potential Soviet action.”16
A 1983 State Department briefing document reveals the United
States recognized a Pakistani had stolen European technology in aid
of Pakistan’s active uranium enrichment program.17 Despite the theft
and the fact the United States also knew China was assisting Pakistan
in developing nuclear weapons, the then US President Ronald Reagan
continued to allow aid to flow to Pakistan, citing national interest
concerns.18 Today China matters even more. An article published during
the height of the February 2019 skirmish reinforces both US and Chinese
interests in South Asia. “Washington has been wooing New Delhi for
the past several years, going so far as to rename its Pacific Command to
‘Indo-Pacific’ [emphasis in original] and signing weapons deals with Prime
Minister Narendra Modi’s government, hoping to use India as a regional
counterweight to China.”19

Three Crises

Three recent conflicts between India and Pakistan reveal common
themes and provide examples showing how escalation toward major
military confrontation was avoided. The 1999 Kargil crisis was the first
major conflict following the ascension of both countries to the status of
nuclear powered nation-states. Pakistan provoked the crisis by sending
troops across the Kargil border. According to one expert, the move by
Pakistan was intended to signal to the international community Kashmir
was a geopolitical issue that could merit nuclear escalation. “This aim
would align with the broader perspective of India viewing Kashmir as a
bilateral issue and Pakistan viewing it as one requiring the international
community’s participation. . . . The Pakistani offensive in the Kargil

15. US DoS, The Pakistani Nuclear Program, declassified, (Washington, DC: US DoS, June 23,
1983), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/docs/doc22.pdf.
16. US DoS, Office of the Historian, “Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting between
Secretary of Defense Brown and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping” in Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan, Document 150, ed. David Zierler and Adam M.
Howard (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), https://history.state.gov
/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v12/d150.
17. DoS, Pakistani Nuclear Program.
18. “Escalating India-Pakistan Conflict a Major Headache for China & US,” RT, February 28,
2019, https://www.rt.com/news/452627-india-pakistan-conflict-spillover/.
19. “Escalating India-Pakistan Conflict.”
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district of Kashmir reflected a strategy of ‘preemptive defense,’ with
Pakistan responding in anticipation of presumed Indian offensives.”20
If nuclear weapons enabled and emboldened such political moves,
options were dwindling in the face of fear, enlarging the scope of the
Kargil incident and restraint. Consequently, the United States stepped
in and the then US President Bill Clinton and United States Central
Command leadership spoke to Indian and Pakistani leadership, providing
political cover and an exit to withdraw from the tensions along the Line
of Control. The end of the Kargil War represented a watershed moment
in Indo-American dialogue. American foreign policy in India shifted
focus from nonproliferation in South Asia to conflict prevention. More
importantly, the United States started publicly siding with India against
Pakistan’s sheltering of al-Qaida, even before the attacks of 9/11.21
The 2001–2 “Twin Peaks” crisis brought India and Pakistan
closer to the brink of major war. The first peak occurred when Islamic
militants attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001. India opted
for compellence to convince Islamabad to stop militant/terrorist groups
from infiltrating and attacking. In order to carry this out, India launched
Operation Parakam, mobilizing military forces along the international
Pakistan-India border. In response, Pakistan mobilized its forces along
the Line of Control and the international border.
The second peak arose five months later when terrorists attacked
an Indian army base located at the international border. The tension
and possible threat of military conflict in the aftermath of the first peak
led the international community to put pressure on the then President
Pervez Musharraf to announce formally he would not let his country
be the launching pad for terrorist attacks. The war in Afghanistan
post-9/11 committed the United States to the region, so much so
that de-escalating what might have initially been a bilateral situation
became multidimensional. “The U.S. war in Afghanistan played an
important role restraining India from striking Pakistan, a key U.S.
ally in Afghanistan and the broader war on terrorism. This motivation
was especially important because the United States did not want
Pakistani troops redirected from counterterrorism operations to the
Indian border.”22
On November 26, 2008, 10 gunmen—thought to be associated
with Pakistani-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba—killed 170
people in Mumbai. India blamed Pakistan for allowing the gunmen to
operate from its territory. Unlike the two previous crises, India did not
rush to mobilize forces along the border, and as a result Pakistan resisted
20. Zafar Khan, “Crisis Management in Nuclear South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective,” in
Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories, ed. Sameer Lalwani and
Hannah Haegeland (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018), 146, http://crises.stimson.org
/nuclear/.
21. Bruce Riedel, “How the 1999 Kargil Conflict Redefined US-India Ties,” Order From Chaos
(blog) Brookings, July 24, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/24
/how-the-1999-kargil-conflict-redefined-us-india-ties/.
22. Khan, “Crisis Management.”
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the urge to match India’s provocation. The United States stepped in
again, but this time swiftly ahead of any major mobilization. The exact
reasons for India’s restraint in the face of the mass killing are still
unknown, but the countries ultimately avoided a military standoff.
The United States was committed to defuse the situation. “Pakistan
remained a critical frontline state for cooperation. Washington needed
Islamabad to not only play an effective role in the Afghanistan peace
process but also to support the withdrawal of its forces and war equipment
from the region through Pakistan.”23 According to one observer, there
were other reasons why the United States was an effective if not de facto
broker and why the then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice engaged
directly with both Indian and Pakistani leadership. “The United States’
intervention was considered benign by both New Delhi and Islamabad,
and thereby welcomed by both despite having different expectations
from the mediator and diverse outcomes of the settlement.”24

Consequences of 1999–2008

A few observations can be made regarding India’s and Pakistan’s
experience with the aforementioned military conflicts and their mutual
avoidance of nuclear escalation. To begin with, both countries were
relatively new to the nuclear club while testing the limits of brinkmanship.
They were also learning how to balance various strategic actions. For
example, even though both countries could and did extend the scopes of
particular crises, they did so with opportunistic pathways for improving
communication and generating mutually accepted restraint mechanisms.
India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were not born from an
existential Cold War framework—they were not seeking to annihilate
one another from the start due to an ideological clash. For India and
Pakistan, nuclear weapons’ advancement coevolved with their changing
security and political interests. The notion of proxy wars and extended
deterrence in the case of India and Pakistan also do not accurately
capture the nature of their conflict.
For instance, given the United States is not fighting a proxy war
against China on the border of India and Pakistan, nonstate actors such
as terrorist organizations are able to conduct limited attacks under the
nuclear cover. In other words, terrorist groups not officially sponsored
by the state and that operate transnationally can carry out some attacks
without being subject to the consequences of symmetric deterrence
between nation-states. Such terrorist groups do not often follow the
political unity and governance structures of the nation-state or even
rational chains of command. As a result, retaliating against a nationstate in response to the actions of rogue terrorist groups would be hard
to justify internationally.

23. Khan, “Crisis Management,” 152.
24. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Paradox of Deterrence: India-Pakistan Strategic Relations,” Strategic
Studies 29, no. 4 (2009).

92

Parameters 50(4) Winter 2020–21

Nonetheless, although terrorist attacks do not warrant nuclear
escalation at least in the three historical cases discussed, the threat of
nuclear escalation, even if deployed politically and purposively, only
realizes itself in Indo-Pakistani relations when conventional forces
take positions along borders such as the Line of Control. In this sense,
it is conventional war and major military conflict that act as critical
thresholds, opening the door to escalation.

2019 Crisis

On February 14, 2019, a suicide bomber with links to the Pakistani
terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked a military convoy
in Pulwama—a district in India’s northern region of Jammu and
Kashmir—killing over 40 Indian soldiers. In response, India conducted
air strikes supposedly targeting a terrorist base camp in Balakot in the
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. While India claimed it
had killed scores of Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists, Pakistan and later
third-party satellite imagery revealed no damage was done to any of the
targeted buildings.25
Whether Pakistan was able to intercept the Indian Mirage 2000 jets
is still uncertain. Nonetheless India launched air strikes in a calculated
strategy of compellence. Conscious of not escalating tensions too close
to the brink of nuclear war, and definitely with the April 11–May 23 Lok
Sabha general elections in mind, Indian leadership ordered air strikes
on Pakistan land, but instead of hitting real targets, India bombed
wooded areas as a warning measure. A day later, Pakistan retaliated
by sending in air strikes, and according to one report, Pakistani F-16s
targeted Indian army positions near the Line of Control. The report
noted: “A Pakistani major general said that the jets locked on to Indian
targets to demonstrate capability, but then purposefully avoided causing
damage. . . . The response appears to be a sort of minimum required
reaction to demonstrate its resolve against the Indian military entering
its territory without doing anything that would warrant a
serious response.”26
Both countries claimed their fighters shot down the other’s
aircraft, but the only concrete evidence was an uploaded video
confirming Pakistan shot down and captured an Indian pilot who was
subsequently released.27 Meanwhile, Pakistan arrested several dozen
terrorist organization members as a sign to India and the international

25. Martin Howell, Gerry Doyle, and Simon Scarr, “Satellite Images Show Buildings
Still Standing at Indian Bombing Site, Reuters, March 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-airstrike-insi/satellite-images-show-buildings-still-standing-at
-indian-bombing-site-idUSKCN1QN00V.
26. Phillip Orchard and Xander Snyder, “Why India and Pakistan Avoided Nuclear War,” Real
Clear World, March 7, 2019, https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/03/07/why_india
_and_pakistan_avoided_nuclear_war_112984.html.
27. “IAF Pilot Abhinandan: Wing Commander Returns Home, Received by BSF Officials,”
Business Today India, March 1, 2019, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics
/india-pakistan-tension-live-updates-iaf-pilot-wing-commander-abhinandan-iaf-to-release/story
/323483.html.
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community that it was doing its part to curb terrorist activities within
Pakistan’s borders.28 The Indian air strikes are notable for being the first
time since 1971 that India struck a target within Pakistan, even if it was
just an empty field. This attack was also the first time any nuclear power
conducted air strikes in the territory of another nuclear power.
Notwithstanding the usual finger-pointing as to who was the
aggressor, certain realities, old and new, emerged in the wake of the air
strikes. Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies were communicating
constantly throughout the crisis and afterwards, even if the messages
were mutual threats of nonnuclear conventional missile exchanges.
(Ironically, hostilities between India and Pakistan were heating up at the
same time US President Donald Trump was in Hanoi hoping to strike
a deal with North Korea on its nuclear weapons program.) According
to the Pakistani Foreign Minister, China and the UAE intervened and
expressed their concerns regarding escalating tensions.
But if the United States was not actively involved and committed
to crisis management to the same extent as it had been before, how
was this tense moment defused? Are we to agree with Joshua White,
a former White House official, who asserted, “Indian and Pakistani
leaders have long evinced confidence that they can understand each
other’s deterrence signals and can de-escalate at will”?29 Evidently so,
as the Indian government rejected the Trump administration’s offer
to mediate, citing the tension with Pakistan over Kashmir would be
strictly bilateral.30
During this time, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan stated:
“History tells us that wars are full of miscalculation. My question is
that given the weapons we have can we afford miscalculation. . . .We
should sit down and talk.”31 Several weeks after the return of India’s
captured pilot, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi at an election rally
responded regarding the purpose of nuclear weapons. “What do we have
then? Have we kept our nuclear bomb for Diwali?”32 Since Diwali is the
Hindu festival of lights, equating nuclear weapons with fireworks is a
Hindutva-arousing and politically effective, yet crass evocation.

28. Barnini Chakraborty, “Several Dozen Arrested in Pakistan over Attack in Indian
Kashmir,” Fox News, March 5, 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/world/several-dozen-arrested
-in-pakistan-over-attack-in-indian-kashmir.
29. Sanjeev Miglani and Drazen Jorgic, “INSIGHT-India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash
Missiles at Each Other-Sources,” Reuters, March 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article
/india-kashmir-crisis/insight-india-pakistan-threatened-to-unleash-missiles-at-each-other-sources
-idINL3N2150XD.
30. Matthew Lee, “India Again Rejects Trump’s Kashmir Mediation Offer,” ABC News,
August 2, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/india-rejects-trumps-kashmir
-mediation-offer-64726009.
31. Drazen Jorgic, “Pakistan PM Urges Talks with India to End Crisis, Avoid Miscalculation,”
Reuters, February 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-primeminister
/pakistan-pm-urges-talks-with-india-to-end-crisis-avoid-miscalculation-idUSKCN1QG1C2.
32. “Have We Kept Our Nuclear Bomb for Diwali, Asks Narendra Modi,” Hindu, April 21,
2019, https://www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha-2019/have-we-kept-our-nuclear-bomb-for
-diwali-asks-narendra-modi/article26905408.ece.
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On February 14, 2019, the then US National Security Adviser John
Bolton remarked that the United States “support[s] India’s right to self
defense.”33 The timing and delivery of such diplomatic pronouncements
did more damage than good; the statement not only condoned India’s
reaction but emboldened India to continue pressing for a moreaggressive strategy. The Hill newspaper noted: “We should all remember
this statement as the moment Bolton reset India-Pakistan relations as
we’ve known them since 1947. Once a deliberate and cautious back
channel intermediary on security flare-ups between the nuclear-armed
rivals, the United States has taken yet another step back from Pakistan
and one closer to India.”34 By failing to mediate either willingly or not,
the United States paved the way for India’s encroachment into Kashmir
and Jammu just a few months later.

Strategic Findings

The 1999 Kargil crisis proved Pakistan could still provoke and engage
in limited conflict below the threat of nuclear war. This is often known
as the stability-instability paradox; “Strategic stability creates instability
by making lower levels of violence relatively safe and undermining
‘extended deterrence’.”35 The handling of the early 2019 crisis, however,
demonstrated to India and Pakistan they could no longer depend on the
United States to step in as a mediator and distributor of political favors
to both sides.
Moreover, given the United States is trying to diminish its
footprint in the Middle East, it will have less leverage and ability to
provide politically expedient off-ramps and face-saving channels. In
future crises, both countries will exercise brinkmanship in an effort to
dominate escalation, but the real question is how confident India and
Pakistan are regarding their ability to carry out de-escalation. “Neither
India nor Pakistan would want uncontrolled escalation, but . . . on whose
terms will the conflict end? For India, an extra shot would have to be
fired, so to speak, for it to walk away satisfied. Pakistan, on the other
hand, would want to exit immediately after it has responded to India’s
initial aggression.”36
Conventional realist deterrence theory provides limited analytical
purchase in understanding how India and Pakistan conceive of and
leverage the threat of using nuclear weapons. Because one cannot
discount the presence and role of the United States, Russia, and China in

33. “U.S. Adviser Bolton Promises India Support after Kashmir Attack,” Reuters,
February 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-usa/u-s-adviser-bolton-promises
-india-support-after-kashmir-attack-idUSKCN1Q504T.
34. Shamila N. Chaudhary, “Better Late Than Never: US Comes to Its Senses on IndiaPakistan Conflict,” Hill, February 28, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/432031
-better-late-than-never-us-comes-to-its-senses-on-india-pakistan.
35. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 19–20.
36. Moeed Yusuf, “Banking on an Outsider: Implications for Escalation Control in South
Asia,” Arms Control Today 41 (June 2011): 20–27.
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the region, India and Pakistan are not just aiming their nuclear strategies
at one another—multiple potential adversaries are in the offing.
One expert argues even though the political actors in the region are
the same, shifting trends on the ground induce new realities. Pakistan
will become increasingly anxious about its immediate security because
(1) India’s economy is grower stronger, (2) the United States is enhancing
its partnership with India as a counterweight to China, and (3) China’s
security concerns will outstrip any sense of unwavering receptiveness
to relieving Pakistan’s distresses. In this new environment, regional
nuclearization will not be checked by the United States alone. Such
sentiment seems to be calling for a pivot in thinking away from a post–
Cold War unipolar world, one which makes room for a postcolonial
theory of nuclear deterrence.37
An important corrective to any working theory must contain
empirical data and/or observations. For some, such a corrective
entails treating the critical unit of analysis not in terms of nuclear
weapons capability but rather nuclear posture. “Nuclear posture is the
incorporation of some number and type of nuclear warheads and
delivery vehicles into a state’s overall military structure, the rules and
procedures governing how those weapons are deployed, when and under
what conditions they might be used, against what targets, and who has the
authority to make those decisions.”38
Posture and not simply the category of abstract capabilities dictate
just how one country might deter another. “This focus on postures as
a variable . . . is preferable because it maintains the focus on observable
[emphasis in original] capabilities, organizational procedures and
interests, and patterns of behavior that are measurable both to adversaries
and analysts.”39

Recommendations

Just months after the February 2019 attack, India revoked Articles
370 and 35-A of its constitution.40 On August 5, 2019, the ruling political
party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party, changed legislation ensuring
the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir would no longer hold its
semiautonomous status. Needless to say, placing Jammu and Kashmir
under greater Indian control will certainly cause a humanitarian and
security crisis for Muslim residents living in that state, which may very
well engulf India and Pakistan in yet another round of military conflict.
The United States should be prepared to mediate diplomatically and
proactively from the start of any such conflict.

37. See also Bharat Karnad, “South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Nuclear Deterrence
Theory,” India Review 4, no. 2 (2005): 173–213, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480500225640.
38. Vipin Narang, “Deterring Unequally: Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International
Conflict,” International Security Colloquium (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2011), 10.
39. Narang, “Deterring Unequally.”
40. Spriha Srivastava, “India Revokes Special Status for Kashmir. Here’s What It Means,”
CNBC, August 5, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/05/article-370-what-is-happening-in
-kashmir-india-revokes-special-status.html.
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Some experts believe India and Pakistan should create constant
lines of communication and bilateral crisis management institutions
in order to manage future crises better. “Adopting proposals such as
regular communication and meetings between local commanders,
coordinated patrolling . . . would improve the LoC situation, serving as
a major confidence-building measure to transform the political nature
of the relationship.”41 Communication when deterrence fails also needs
to be addressed and applied to cooperative military exercises and/or war
gaming. Here the United States could supply command, control, and
communication assets and training. The failure of deterrence may be
quite different in both form and function for India than for Pakistan.
Avoiding miscalculation by communicating intent and doctrinal shifts
will help manage escalation should a nuclear weapon ever be launched.
Several principles will help the United States understand and
contend with security in the region. For the US military, it is important
to realize terrorist groups operating within Pakistan, whether or not
officially endorsed by Pakistani civilian leadership, will retaliate for the
recent accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Pakistan interprets
this emboldened move by India as more than just a territorial grab; it is a
provocation exacerbating the clash of identities that underlies how India
and Pakistan regard the relationship between (fundamentalist) religion
and nationhood. Consequently India and Pakistan will have claims to
both offensive and defensive deterrence for the foreseeable future.
To make matters worse, India will see more jihadist-inspired attacks
and will continue to cross into Pakistani territory to deter and punish
such unconventional attacks. The US military must be cognizant of the
cultural and politically contingent logics driving the escalation and deescalation of tensions in the region. The possession of nuclear weapons
has not been the sole cause or even instigator of Indo-Pakistani conflict
over the past few decades. Rather, nuclear weapons have opened and
closed particular options.
Next, efforts should be taken to emphasize conflict resolution rather
than short-term actions geared toward de-escalation. In this regard, the
United States should avoid conveying the impression it is choosing sides.
Instead, it should help both India and Pakistan develop better crisis
management mechanisms while “continu[ing] to de-hyphenate Pakistan
and India by addressing both countries on issues beyond their mutual
antagonism.”42 Both nations engage in bilateral relations with the United
States; they are not part of any formal defense alliance.
Another possible course of action, and one the United States should
champion, is potential nonproliferation treaties India and Pakistan could
construct and enter bilaterally. Some experts have made the interesting
case that: “India has sought to resignify the Western discourse of
41. Fahad Nabeel, “3 Scenarios for India-Pakistan Relations under Modi 2.0: Can India
and Pakistan Shift the Balance from Confrontation to Cooperation?,” Diplomat, June 25, 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/three-scenarios-for-india-pakistan-relations-under-modi-2-0/.
42. Richard Weitz, Promoting US-Indian Defense Cooperation: Opportunities and Obstacles (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2017).
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nuclear responsibility such that it is linked to nuclear disarmament and
equality rather than nuclear nonproliferation and hierarchy. . . . India’s
status as a responsible nuclear power is based, not on its compliance
with international regimes or norms, but on its ‘civilizational
exceptionalism’.”43 If India and Pakistan could decolonize the discourse
and hegemony of Western nuclear arms control by taking the higher
moral ground, both sides would learn from each other directly without
having to risk the breakdown in communications and trust resulting
from the involvement of middlemen.
The US Indo-Pacific Command should invest in strategies for
integrating Pakistani military officers into its operations. Foreign
exchange officer programs are fruitful. Additionally, holding important
regional exercises featuring both Pakistani and Indian military leadership
at the helm would clearly show the United States is not picking sides.
The United States could also let China play a more prominent leadership
role by endorsing particular conferences and security forums inviting
Pakistan and India to the table, even if they take place in Beijing. The
United States could also partner with China in establishing better
security and economic outcomes for South Asia more broadly.
Lastly, by providing command, control, and communication
technology and training support, the United States would help India
and Pakistan underscore and strengthen their crisis management
systems. Empowering India and Pakistan to strengthen their respective
intelligence systems will allow the two nation-states to navigate
disruptions emerging from a future that will inevitably involve hybrid
conflicts. These gray-zone conflicts include campaigns such as (dis)
information operations, troop movements, cyberattacks, and more.
Providing technology and training would require the United States to
engage in constant communication with India and Pakistan and transmit
clear and consistent foreign policy goals.
Finally, the United States should increase strategic planning in the
region with both India and Pakistan, without playing one side against
the other. Developing common and relevant training relationships
during peacetime with India and Pakistan together is critical. Ultimately
the United States has an opportunity to fulfill its commitment to the
region, not as an adversary but as a geopolitical power with well-defined
priorities for peace.
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